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CHARITABLE GIVING AND TAX
LEGISLATION IN THE REAGAN ERA
CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER*
I
INTRODUCTION
The nonprofit sector-a multi-billion dollar amalgam that includes
churches, hospitals, colleges and universities, symphonies, museums, and
social welfare agencies-receives a sizable portion of its support in the form of
charitable contributions.' In 1983, individual donors contributed almost $54
billion to charitable nonprofit organizations, as shown in Table 1. Charitable
bequests and corporate contributions added another $7 billion. Although few
TABLE 1
CHARITABLE GIVING IN 1983 BY SOURCEa
Source Amount Percent
(billions)
Individuals $ 53.9 88
Estates 4.5 7
Corporations 3.1 5
Total $ 61.5 100
aAMERICAN Assoc. OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, INC.,
GIVING USA 42 (1984).
would claim that taxes are the most important determinant of such
contributions, it is now widely accepted that taxes are one important influence
in determining the amount of such giving. 2 The federal income and estate tax
laws allow deductions for charitable gifts. The income tax provides to those
who itemize their deductions a charitable deduction covering gifts of cash and
other property to qualifying charitable nonprofit organizations.3
Corporations are allowed to deduct charitable gifts up to 10% of net income. 4
Under the estate tax, charitable bequests are allowed to reduce the taxable
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estate without limit.5 A sizable amount of econometric evidence has been
amassed to suggest that these deduction provisions, as well as the marginal
tax rates for each income bracket, influence giving to charitable organizations
by individuals, corporations, and estates.6 It is not surprising, therefore, to
discover that charitable organizations view tax reform with some trepidation,
fearing that changes in the tax system may reduce charitable giving. An
analysis of tax legislation in the Reagan Administration suggests that the
effects of various reforms, either enacted or proposed, may vary considerably,
depending on which groups of taxpayers are most affected by the changes.
In recent years, tax legislation has been an area of considerable activity,
with at least one major tax bill being passed every other year. The first major
tax bill of the Reagan Administration, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (ERTA), 7 contained several provisions that are likely to affect charitable
contributions directly or indirectly. The 1982 tax act,8 in contrast, had only a
minor effect on charitable giving. It would be quite incomplete to limit the
discussion of tax legislation in the "Reagan era" to those two acts, however.
With the encouragement and participation of the President and his
supporters, a number of important tax alternatives have been actively
discussed from the first days of the Administration, including "flat-rate"
income taxes, an expenditure tax, and a value-added tax.9 Flat-rate income
taxes would literally impose a constant rate of taxation on all taxable income.
More generally, the generic category of flat-rate taxes has been applied to a
number of proposals that broaden the income tax base and cut the top tax
rates, whether the rate structure is actually flat or not. For example, the
Treasury Department unveiled a detailed tax plan in November 1984
embodying many features of other comprehensive income tax proposals. In
contrast, an expenditure tax would exempt savings from taxation but
otherwise would look quite similar to the current income tax. A value-added
tax would be levied on firms at each stage of production. 10 Any full
assessment of the impact of "Reagan era" tax legislation on charitable giving
should account for tax proposals such as these as well as actual legislation
during the Reagan Administration.
This article examines the effects of actual and potential tax legislation on
charitable contributions. Most attention is devoted to the impact on
contributions by individuals because of the overwhelming importance of such
gifts, but the effects on corporate and bequest giving are also noted. Section
5. Id. § 2055(a) (Lawyers Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Feldstein & Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 ECONOMETRICA
1201 (1976).
7. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
8. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
9. E.g., S. 557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983) (Hall-
Rubushka, DeConcini) (flat tax); Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (expenditure); 3 U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREAS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1984).
10. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 458-63 (3d ed.
1980), for a discussion of value-added taxes.
[Vol. 48: No. 4
Page 197: Autumn 1985]
II discusses the relationship between tax structure and charitable giving. The
effect of taxes on the net income of potential donors and the "tax-price" of
their contributions is emphasized. In addition, Section II outlines the tax
effects on the distribution of giving by type of organization. Section III
discusses the provisions of ERTA and their effect on charitable giving by
individuals. Section IV discusses the effects of ERTA on bequest and
corporate giving. Section V examines the likely effect of tax reform proposals,
such as a flat-rate income tax, an expenditure tax, and a value-added tax on
the level and distribution of individual contributions.
II
TAXES AND CHARITABLE GIVING
In order to assess the likely effects of tax legislation on charitable giving, it
is necessary to turn to empirical research on giving behavior. It is especially
important to examine the effect of taxes on disposable income and the net
cost of contributions. It is also useful to assess the effect of taxes on the
distribution of gifts by type of organization. Most of the section is devoted to
considering contributions by individuals. Giving from estates and
corporations is considered at the end of the section.
A. Price and Income Effects
Charitable behavior differs from ordinary consumer behavior in several
obvious ways. Values, commitment, duty, and sympathy may play deciding
roles in motivating charitable donations and volunteer behavior. Like
ordinary consumer behavior, however, charitable giving is also affected by the
capacity to give and the relative net cost of contributions. Capacity to make
contributions may be measured by disposable income, that is, income after
taxes. If charitable giving is a "normal" good, for which the demand
increases as disposable income increases, an increase in tax liability would be
expected to cause a decline in contributions. A tax cut, on the other hand,
would stimulate giving.
Taxes also affect giving by influencing the net cost per dollar of
contributions, and this effect is comparable to the effect of a commodity's
price on its demand. If there were not a deduction for charitable giving, the
gift of one dollar to a charitable organization would reduce the amount of
other consumption possible by one dollar. If, on the other hand,
contributions are subject to an income tax deduction, donations have the
effect of reducing tax liability. Thus, the reduction in other consumption
resulting from a one dollar gift is not a full dollar. For a person subject to a
25% marginal tax rate, for example, an increase in deductible contributions of
one dollar would result in a reduction of $.25 in tax liability. Thus, the net
cost of the gift would be only $.75 per dollar given. In the presence of a
deduction for charitable giving, the net cost, the "price," of giving falls as the
marginal tax rate rises. To illustrate how this price varies among actual
taxpayers, Table 2 presents information on income, tax rates, and the net cost
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of contributions for taxpayers who itemized their deductions in 1982. For
taxpayers at these average incomes, the marginal tax rate in 1982 varied from
zero to 50%. For taxpayers in the 50% rate bracket, contributions had a net
TABLE 2
AVERAGE INCOME AND CONTRIBUTIONS, TAX RATE AND NET COST OF
DONATIONS FOR TAXPAYERS WITH ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS,
1982a
Income Class Average Marginal Average Net Cost Per
Income Tax Rate Contributions Dollar of Cash
(percent) Donations
(Tax-Price)
Under $5,000 $ 2,565 0 $ 192 $ 1.00
$ 5,000 - 10,000 7,399 14 516 .86
$10,000 - 15,000 12,403 16 583 .84
$15,000 - 20,000 17,335 19 616 .81
$20,000 - 25,000 22,482 22 646 .78
$25,000 - 30,000 27,489 25 685 .75
$30,000 - 40,000 34,473 33 813 .67
$40,000 - 50,000 44,315 39 1,110 .61
$50,000 - 75,000 58,653 44 1,511 .56
$75,000 - 100,000 85,051 49 2,457 .51
$100,000 - 200,000 131,625 50 4,531 .50
$200,000-500,000 285,028 50 12,071 .50
$500,000-1,000,000 667,500 50 33,807 .50
$1,000,000 and over 2,239,705 50 146,545 .50
a Calculated from data in Epstein, Preliminary Income and Tax Statistics for 1982 Individual Income Tax
Returns, 3 STATS. INCOME BULL., Winter 1983-84, at 11, 19, Table 1.
cost of only $.50 per dollar. Taxpayers who are not subject to tax, or who do
not itemize their deductions, face a net cost of a full dollar. I
Table 2 makes clear that contributions by itemizing taxpayers rise with
income and fall with the tax-defined price. Since income and net cost move in
opposite directions, it is impossible to determine on the basis of data such as
these to what extent the increase in giving as one moves up the income scale is
due to increasing income and to what extent it is due to a falling net cost per
dollar giving.
In order to disentangle the effects of income and net cost, it is necessary to
hold one factor constant and examine the other. For example, one may
examine the giving behavior of taxpayers who itemize their deductions
compared to taxpayers who do not at given levels of income, as shown in
11. One important complication in the calculation of tax price is giving in the form of
appreciated assets, which would otherwise be subject to long-term capital gains treatment. See
Feldstein & Taylor, supra note 6, at 1202-04, 1205-06, for a discussion of how this consideration may
be taken into account in calculating tax price. This article ignores gifts of appreciated assets, but the
simulations presented infra account for the proportion of gifts made in noncash form and assume a
gain-to-basis ratio for contributed assets for 50%. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 2, for
futher discussion.
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE GIVING BY INCOME AND ITEMIZATION STATUS, 1973a
Income Itemized Did Not Itemize
Less than $4,000 $ 119* $ 69
$4,000 - 7,999 215 89
$8,000 -9,999 314 117
$10,000 - 14,999 407 201
$15,000 - 19,999 600 329
$20,000 - 29,999 800 354
$30,000 - 49,999 1,564 171"
$50,000 - 99,999 5,679 3,190"
$100,000 - 199,999 17,106 816"
$200,000 - 499,999 39,763 8,892*
$500,000 or more 71,316 5,000*
All $ 775 $ 140
a Morgan, Dye & Hybels, Results from Two National Surveys of Philanthropic Activity, in I RESEARCH
PAPERS 157, 193, Table 24 (Commission on Private Philanthropy & Public Needs, U.S. Dept. of
Treasury 1977).
*Based on fewer than 25 observations.
Table 3. The table shows that, at each income level, taxpayers who itemize
their deductions give more than those who do not itemize. Such a difference
would be consistent with the hypothesis that the price reduction created by a
deduction has an effect independent of income. This is not a definitive test,
however. Taxpayers at a given income who itemize their deductions may
differ systematically from those who do not. In order to examine the effect of
net cost on the giving of taxpayers who itemize, it is necessary to turn to
econometric techniques to separate the effects of income and net cost. Such
econometric studies can use information on differences in giving over a large
number of taxpayers to infer the independent effects of income, net cost, and
other factors, such as age and family composition.
Such econometric studies have been performed for a wide variety of data
sources, some including nonitemizers and some not.' 2 The strong consensus
arising from these studies is that net income and price have separate effects on
giving.' 3 Although there is variability in specific parameter estimates, an
income elasticity of about 0.7 and a price elasticity of about - 1.3 are quite
representative of a broad range of econometric findings.' 4 An income
elasticity of 0.7 implies that a 10% increase in net income would, other things
equal, be associated with an increase in giving of about 7%. A price elasticity
of - 1.3 would imply an increase in giving of about 13% in response to a drop
in the tax price of 10%, say from 0.6 to 0.54.
This empirical work has rather specific implications for the effect of tax
legislation on charitable giving. Any legislation that significantly changes tax
12. For a summary of some of these studies, see Clotfelter & Steuerle, supra note 2, at 407-22.
13. See id
14. For a review of econometric estimates of such elasticities, see Clotfelter & Steuerle, supra
note 2.
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prices or after-tax incomes will be expected to influence the level of giving.
The legislation likely to have the most profound effect on contributions would
be any elimination or major modification of the charitable deduction itself.
Feldstein and Taylor estimated that the elimination of the charitable
deduction would cause contributions by itemizers to fall by 25%.15 By the
same token, flat-rate tax schemes16 that would eliminate the charitable
deduction could be expected to have similar effects. Although such legislative
changes would affect giving to some extent through effects on net income,
their dominant impact would be in raising the tax price of making
contributions. Less obviously, tax schemes that bring about a significant
reduction in tax rates could have a marked effect on tax-defined prices for
those who itemize and could bring about a reduction in giving. It is not
necessary to experience anything as dramatic as a new tax bill in order to
observe changes in prices for giving, however. Simply the effect of inflation
on effective tax rates, through the process of "bracket creep," will affect the
prices of taxpayers who move to different tax brackets. Similarly, inflation
tends to make it desirable for some taxpayers to begin itemizing their
deductions when previously they did not, as their expenditures exceed the
threshold level for itemizing. Thus, the presence or absence of indexation of
tax brackets will also be expected to affect charitable giving through the
influence of inflation on effective tax rates. Actual and proposed tax
legislation must therefore be examined for both intended and unintended
effects on charitable giving.
B. Distribution of Giving by Type of Organization
Tax legislation, as well as inflation-induced bracket creep, will also be
expected to affect the distribution of tax liabilities among taxpayers. If the
aggregate total of income taxes increases or decreases, aggregate net income
will change and so will contributions. It is more likely, however, that tax
revenues for any actual or proposed legislation will be kept approximately
constant. It is the distribution of these liabilities across taxpayers in different
income brackets that is most likely to change. 17 Because net income has a
positive effect on contributions, taxpayers who enjoy tax cuts will tend to give
more, and vice versa. Modifications in tax schedules may also change the
distribution of prices among taxpayers, resulting in other changes in giving
that would vary by income. For this reason, it is important to determine how
the giving patterns of taxpayers vary across the income scale. Table 4
presents a percentage distribution of charitable gifts by households at
different income levels, based on a survey taken in 1973. The table indicates,
15. Feldstein & Taylor, supra note 6, at 1206, 1217-18.
16. E.g., H.R. 542, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H93 (daily ed.Jan. 6, 1983) (Crane); S.
557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983) (Hall-Rubushka,
DeConcini).
17. In order to raise the same revenue that the current income tax raises, a flat-rate tax, even
with an exemption, would tend to reduce tax liabilities at the upper income levels and increase them
elsewhere.
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTIONS* TO TYPE OF ORGANIZATION BY
INCOME, 1973a
Income Religion Education Combined Medical/ Culture Other Not Total
Higher Other Appeals Health Major Identifiedt
$0-9,999 59% 1% 0% 2% 3% 0% 2% 33% 100%
$10,000-
19,999 67 1 0 3 3 0 4 22 100
$20,000-
29,999 59 2 1 5 4 0 10 19 100
$30,000-
49,999 42 5 7 6 3 3 6 28 100
$50,000-
99,999 16 9 1 10 11 4 19 30 100
$100,000-
199,999 10 14 5 9 10 5 6 41 100
$200,000-
499,999 8 27 6 10 11 6 8 24 100
$500,000-
or more 9 24 3 6 6 9 16 27 100
Total 46 5 2 6 5 2 8 26 100
*Percentages represent total gifts to donee by income class.
aMorgan,.Dye & Hybels, Results from Two National Surveys of Philanthropic Activity, in I RESEARCH PAPERS
157, 208, Table 38 (Commission on Private Philanthropy & Public Needs, U.S. Dept. of Treasury
1977).
tInformation regarding donees was obtained only for the four major gifts of each donor; therefore
additional giving could not be allocated to donee categories.
for example, that households with incomes between $20,000 and $30,000 in
1973 gave almost 60% of their contributions to religious organizations, 5% to
combined appeals, and about 2% to colleges and universities. By contrast,
taxpayers in the highest income group directed less than 10% of their gifts to
religious organizations, about the same percentage to combined appeals, and
almost a quarter of their gifts to colleges and universities. Because of
differences in giving propensities such as these, the distributional
consequences of tax legislation can have important ramifications for certain
segments of the nonprofit sector.
C. Corporations and Estates
Qualitatively similar effects of taxation have been observed for corporate
contributions and charitable bequests. The price effect for corporate giving
appears to be considerably smaller than that for individual contributions,
although its effect is still significant. After-tax net income appears to be an
important determinant for such giving.' 8 The econometric evidence
regarding charitable bequests is less certain, although it appears that the price
effect for bequest giving is at least as large as that for individual
18. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 5, for a review of this econometric research.
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contributions. 19 The estate tax also affects bequests by affecting the size of
the net estate. Although these sources of contributions are small relative to
individual giving, it is nevertheless useful to consider tax effects in these areas
as well.
III
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAx ACT OF 1981: INDIVIDUAL GIVING
In considering the effect of ERTA on charitable giving, it is important to
focus on three principal provisions, only one of which specifically relates to
charitable contributions. The act takes an important step in the treatment of
contributions by separating the charitable deduction from other itemized
deductions. Since 1982, even those taxpayers not choosing to itemize their
deductions have been able to deduct at least some portion of their
contributions in calculating taxable income.20  This "above-the-line"
deduction has been introduced gradually. In 1982 and 1983, the deduction
was worth 25% of the first $100 of giving; in 1984 the limit was raised to
$300. In 1985, 50% of gifts by nonitemizers are deductible without limit, and
in 1986, all contributions by nonitemizers are to be deductible. A sunset
provision provides that this special deduction will lapse in 1987 if not acted
upon again before that time.21
The second major provision of the 1981 tax act relevant to the
consideration of charitable donations is the general rate reduction. Although
nominal tax brackets were left unchanged through 1984, tax rates were
reduced for all of these brackets.22 The most important reductions occurred
at the top tax brackets: tax rates were cut off at 50%, beginning in 1982.23
This means that the top tax rate fell from 70% to 50% in that year. In lower
tax brackets, there was a 23% proportional reduction in rates over three
years.24 The third provision likely to affect charitable giving is the scheduled
indexation of tax brackets beginning in 1985.25 After that date, the
indexation will prevent purely inflation-induced increases in tax rates, thus
preventing inflationary reductions in the price of giving.
It is possible to identify four main effects of the 1981 tax act on giving by
individuals. Perhaps the clearest effect is the reduction in marginal tax rates
for the highest income groups. For a taxpayer in the previous 70% bracket
making a cash contribution, the price of giving increased by more than 60%
as a result of the lower tax rates (from $.30 to $.50 per dollar). Although this
overstates the actual percentage increase in price for many high income
19. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
20. I.R.C. § 170(i) (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985).
21. Id. § 170(i)(4).
22. Id § 1(a)-(d) (Lawyers Co-op. 1984).
23. Id
24. Id.
25. Id § 1(f).
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taxpayers subject to special tax provisions, 26 the act had a large impact on the
net cost of making contributions by individuals in upper income groups. If
taxpayers in these income groups are as sensitive to the tax-defined price of
giving as econometric models suggest, one would expect to observe large
declines in contributions at these income levels. Second, the effects of the tax
rate deductions at other income levels were offset in part or in whole by the
failure to change nominal tax brackets before 1985. At the same time that tax
rates were being cut, taxpayers were being bumped into higher tax brackets
because of inflation.2 7 Whether the marginal tax rate rose or fell for given
taxpayers not in the top brackets depended on the strength of the tax cut
relative to the inflationary impact. A third effect, also induced by inflation, is
clearer. Because the "zero-bracket amount," the beginning bracket for
taxation, was not changed in nominal dollars, many taxpayers have found it
advantageous to begin itemizing their deductions as the nominal value of
their expenditures continues to rise throughout this period. Thus, the
percentage of itemizers would be expected to increase. Since the price of
giving for itemizers before 1986 is less than that faced by nonitemizers, this
trend toward itemization implies a lower overall price of giving. Fourth,
above-the-line deductions would be expected to have a significant impact on
giving by nonitemizers beginning in 1985, the year in which the limit on
contributions was lifted. This provision is likely to have its greatest impact
among low and middle income taxpayers. Since these taxpayers give a large
proportion of their donations to religious organizations, one would expect the
above-the-line provision to have its major impact on such institutions.
Table 5 presents simulations based on an econometric model of charitable
giving that attempt to show the likely effect of the 1981 tax act, taking
together all of the influences discussed above. 28 The model takes official
estimates of income and price growth as a basis for future incomes and the
changes to be undertaken in the indexation beginning in 1985. The probable
effect of rising nominal incomes in the presence of a fixed nominal zero
bracket amount is shown in the third column, which shows the estimated
percentage of taxpayers who itemize their deductions over time. This
proportion increases from 31% in 1980 to over 36% in 1986. By itself, this
effect serves to encourage contributions by increasing the number of
taxpayers enjoying the deduction. The fourth and fifth columns give
estimates of total contributions by itemizers and nonitemizers. In constant
26. For example, taxpayers subject to the maximum tax on earned income under previous law
had prices greater than $.30 per dollar. See Clotfelter & Salamon, The Impact of the 1981 Tax Act on
Individual Charitable Giving, 35 NAT'L TAxJ. 171, 175 (1982), for an explanation.
27. For a discussion of this process, see Clotfelter, Tax Cut Meets Bracket Creep: The Rise and Fall of
Marginal Tax Rates 1964-84, 12 PuB. FIN. Q. 131, 132 (1984).
28. One basic model used to estimate the effect of changes in price and income on giving is the
constant elasticity form:
G, = Go (Pl/po) b (Y 1/Yo) a,
where G is contributions, P is price, Y is net income, 0 refers to actual or beginning values, 1 refers to
the simulated values, and a and b are constant parameters. For a more complete discussion of the
simulation methodology, see C. CLOrFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
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dollars, total giving is estimated to have changed very little between 1980 and
1983, then to have risen slightly in 1984 and 1985. The largest jump in total
contributions is projected to occur in 1986, when the full above-the-line
deduction is in force. The final column of the table indicates that
contributions by those with the highest incomes will not increase as fast as
donations by the group of taxpayers as a whole. The proportion of total
contributions given by taxpayers in the top brackets (i.e., taxpayers with
incomes over $50,000 in 1980) is projected to decline from 24% in 1980 to
18% in 1986.
TABLE 5
SIMULATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL GIVING, 1981-1986
Year Assumed increase Percent Total Contributions Percent given by
from previous year itemizing (billions) taxpayers with
Income Prices Current 1981 incomes over $50,000
dollars dollars in 1980
1980 - 3f.0% $ 38.7 $ 42.4 23.8%
1981 11.6% 9.4% 32.6 42.9 42.9 22.6
1982 4.1 6.0 33.1 44.9 42.4 21.4
1983 6.7 5.2 34.0 47.2 42.2 20.3
1984 9.3 5.2 35.3 50.5 43.0 19.4
1985 9.1 4.9 35.7 54.6 44.4 18.6
1986 8.8 4.6 36.2 60.5 47.0 17.9
Although it is still too early to measure the effects of ERTA here,
preliminary evidence suggests that some of these effects are indeed being
observed. Table 6 gives average contributions by itemizing taxpayers for
1981 and 1982. The major change between these two years, of course, was
the drop in marginal tax rates affecting the highest income groups. As the
table shows, average contributions at the highest income levels dropped
markedly over this period, while contributions at other income levels rose
moderately. Because of the large increase in the price of giving at upper
income levels, the decline in giving in the top brackets is quite consistent with
the economic model of giving.
The implications of these differential impacts by income level are shown in
Table 7, which simulates contributions in 1981 and 1986 according to type of
organization. Over this period, gifts to religious organizations are projected
to increase by 14% in real dollars. In sharp contrast, contributions to cultural
organizations and colleges and universities will drop significantly, by an
estimated 17% and 13%, respectively. Gifts to other educational institutions
are also projected to decline. Due to the particular characteristics of the 1981
tax act, therefore, total charitable contributions will rise in real terms over the
period 1981 to 1986. However, virtually all of this growth will occur in the
contributions of taxpayers with low and moderate incomes, taxpayers who
donate a large proportion of their gifts to religious organizations. Gifts
donated by wealthy taxpayers will be encouraged much less than under the
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previous tax law, and this suggests a decline in contributions to organizations
supported primarily by upper income individuals.
TABLE 6
AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS BY ITEMIZERS, 1981 & 1982a
Income Average Contributions Percent
1981 1982 Change
Under $ 5,000 $ 192 $ 192 0
$5,000 - 10,000 490 516 + 5
$10,000 - 15,000 574 583 + 2
$15,000 -20,000 595 617 + 4
$20,000 - 25,000 613 646 + 5
$25,000 - 30,000 643 685 + 7
$30,000 - 50,000 885 918 + 4
$50,000 - 100,000 1,709 1,689 - 1
$100,000 - 200,000 4,716 4,533 - 4
$200,000 - 500,000 14,483 12,099 - 16
$500,000 - 1,000,000 50,125 33,834 - 33
$1,000,000 or more 204,499 146,530 - 28
aEpstein, Preliminary Income and Tax Statistics for 1982 Individual Income Tax Returns, 3 STATS. INCOME
BULL., Winter 1983-84, at 11, 19, Table 1; U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME-
1981: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 53-54, Table 2.1.
TABLE 7
PROJECTED CONTRIBUTIONS BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION,
1981 & 1986
Organization Type Contributions Percent
(billions, 1981 dollars) Change
1981 1986
Religious $ 30.60 $ 34.95 + 14%
Colleges and universities 2.10 1.83 - 13
Other education 0.68 .62 - 9
Combined appeals 2.53 2.58 + 2
Medical 2.49 2.54 + 2
Cultural 0.65 0.54 - 17
Other 3.68 3.73 + 1
Total $ 42.91 $ 47.00 + 10%
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IV
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981:
ESTATES AND CORPORATIONS
Several provisions of ERTA are likely to influence giving by estates and
corporations. ERTA changed the estate tax by significantly increasing the
unified credit (a tax credit applying to gift and estate taxes together),29
reducing the top tax bracket rate from 70% to 50% ,30 and introducing an
unlimited marital deduction. 31 A major effect of the increase in the unified
credit has been to reduce the number of estates subject to the tax at all. In
constant dollars, the minimum size estate subject to the tax is projected to
increase by 150% between 1981 and 1987.32 For the largest estates, the
reduction in tax rate has the effect of increasing the price of making charitable
bequests, as compared to noncharitable bequests, in the same way that the
personal tax rate cut increased the price of giving by living individuals. The
effiects of the increased credit and the cut in rates at the top are similar: they
both serve to increase the relative price of charitable bequests for many
estates, especially the largest estates. The impact of the unlimited marital
deduction is less clear, since this provision allows postponement, but not
cancellation, of tax liabilities. 33
Econometric studies of bequest giving suggest that the estate tax
influences gifts through its effect on the net estate and, similar to the case of
living individuals, its effect on the relative price of charitable bequests.3 4 As
in the case of individuals, price has a measured negative effect on giving,
although the evidence in this area is thinner and more variable than for
individual giving. Using parameters estimated from recent data,3 5 the effect
of the 1981 tax act on bequest giving has been simulated. Total charitable
bequests are likely to fall by at least one-third, from $2.3 billion to $1.5 billion
in 1976 as a result of ERTA. Although such a projection is subject to
considerable uncertainty, it illustrates the potential impact of reduced
marginal tax rates as applied to the largest estates.
The major change in the corporate tax contained in the 1981 tax act was a
significant liberalization of depreciation allowances.3 6 Also relevant to
charitable contributions was an increase in the maximum deduction from 5%
29. I.R.C. § 2010(a) (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985).
30. Id. § 2001(c).
31. Id. § 2056(a).
32. See C. CLOTELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
33. In addition, the law provides for a deduction for the charitable portion of a class of split-
interest charitable remainder trusts, thus removing any incentive to make bequests to a surviving
spouse rather than leave a charitable bequest in such a trust. See STAFF OF JT. COMM'N ON TAX'N,
97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAx ACT OF 1981, at 238
(Comm. Print. 1981).
34. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 6, for a discussion of this research.
35. The data used for the simulation were from the 1976 ESTATE TAX FILE. See C. CLOTFELTER,
supra note 1, at ch. 6.
36. E.g., I.R.C. § 168(a) (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985) (ACRS property); id. § 179 (small
business).
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to 10% of net income.3 7 Since few corporations were at the previous limit, it
seems likely that the higher limit will have little effect, except in industries in
which the new depreciation allowances will reduce net incomes drastically.
Although econometric studies do indicate that the corporate tax exerts both
an income and price effect on corporate giving,38 it is unlikely that the 1981
tax changes will have a significant enough influence on either price or after-
tax income to cause corporate giving to be affected greatly.
V
"FLAT-RATE" INCOME TAXES AND OTHER REFORMS
Spurred by the "supply-side" arguments for lower marginal tax rates, the
notion of a "flat-rate" income tax captured a central place in debates over the
tax structure during the first term of the Reagan Administration. These tax
schemes generally shared two features: lower tax rates (if not literally flat tax
schedules) and a broader income tax base. The broader base would have the
dual virtues of providing a simplified tax structure, and of allowing
comparable revenues to be raised using lower rates. Some proposals sought
to eliminate all deductions,3 9 including contributions, while others provided
for the continuation of popular deductions. 40
Whether or not the rate structure was "flat" or progressive, any broad-
based income tax would affect individual giving as a result of its impact on net
incomes and the price of making contributions. Many of the proposed tax
schemes imply a redistribution of the tax burden from upper incomes to lower
incomes. Apart from other effects, this would tend to benefit charities favored
by the rich, at the expense of those supported by low and middle income
taxpayers.
The more important effect of a broad-based tax, however, would be
manifested in the price of giving. If the charitable deduction were eliminated,
the subsidy for all taxpayers previously enjoying a deduction would disappear.
As noted above, it has been estimated that the elimination of the charitable
deduction would cause contributions to drop by one quarter.4 1 Even with a
deduction, however, a broad-based tax could cause giving to drop
significantly, due to the rise in the price of giving resulting from a sizable cut
in marginal tax rates.
Provisions of various tax proposals are outlined in Table 8. The first two
columns of the table indicate the maximum tax rate and the deduction
37. Id. § 170(b)(2) (Lawyers Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1985).
38. See C. CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
39. E.g., H.R. 542, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H93 (daily ed..Jan. 6, 1983) (Crane); S.
557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rc. S1507 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983) (Hall-Rubushka,
DeConcini).
40. E.g., H.R. 3271, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H3846 (daily ed. June 9, 1983); S.
1421,98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7924 (daily ed.June 8, 1983) (Bradley-Gephardt); H.R.
5533, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H3128 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1984); S. 2600, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S4950 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1984) (Kemp-Kasten).
41. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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provision for contributions for each tax scheme listed. Based on econometric
models of charitable giving, a computer program was written to embody the
provisions of these tax proposals and to produce estimates of giving under
each regime. 42 The last two columns of the table show the estimated change
in giving under alternative tax plans from giving under current law.43 One
model assumes that price and income elasticities are constant while the other
assumes these elasticities vary by income.4 4 Since each estimate is subject to
statistical and other errors, all of the estimates should be taken as merely
approximating the likely effects.
Of the generic flat-rate taxes, one on adjusted gross income (AGI) has the
broadest base and therefore can raise a given amount of revenue with a lower
tax rate (11.8%) than one on taxable income. Because gross income is the
tax base, no deductions are allowed, and the net cost of contributing a dollar
is a full dollar. An alternative is to calculate tax as a flat rate (19.5%) of
currently defined taxable income. Itemizers would continue to receive an
incentive, but the rate of subsidy would differ from the rate under current law.
For taxpayers currently facing marginal rates above 19.5%, the net price of
giving a dollar would rise.
In addition to the flat-tax proposals, Table 8 shows simulated individual
giving under more than a dozen tax reform bills introduced in the 98th
Congress, as well as the 1984 tax proposal of the Treasury Department. 45
The specific proposals put forward in Congress and by the Treasury
Department differ markedly in their breadth of income coverage, exemption
levels, deductions, and tax rates. The DeConcini and Roth bills are variants
of an expenditure tax as distinguished from an income tax. The Treasury
Department's tax plan of November 1984 is a broad-based income tax. The
maximum marginal tax rates vary between 10% and 50%.
Charitable contributions as presently defined would be deductible in most
bills, either by itemizers or by all taxpayers, while only religious contributions
would be deductible under the Hansen bill. The Hatfield bill replaces the
deduction with a credit, subject to a 1% of AGI floor. The Treasury proposal
eliminates the deduction for nonitemizers, imposes a 2% of AGI floor for the
itemized charitable deduction, and ends the favorable treatment of gifts of
appreciated assets.
42. For a description of the methodology used in the simulation, see C. CLOTFELTER, supra note
1, at ch. 3.
43. The current law has tax rates up to 50% and provides a special charitable deduction for
nonitemizers amounting to 50% of gifts without limit. In 1986 this special deduction is scheduled to
be 100% of contributions. I.R.C. § 170(i)(2) (Lawyers Co-op. Supp. 1985).
44. For a discussion of these models, see Clotfelter, Tax Rforam and Charitable Giving in 1985, 26
TAX NoTs 477, 480-81 (1985).
45. For a description of the most important provisions of these tax plans, see id. at 486-87.
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TABLE 8
PRESENT LAW AND SELECTED TAX PROPOSALS: MAXIMUM TAX RATE
AND PROVISIONS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Description Maximum Provision for Predicted giving: Percent
tax rate (%) contributions change from 1985
Constant Variable
elasticity elasticity
model model
Current law
1985
Generic flat-rate taxes
Flat rate on AGI
Flat rate on taxable income
Tax reform proposals-98th Congress
Bradley-Gephardt (H.R. 3271; S.
1421)
DeConcini (S. 557) (Hall-Rubushka)
Kemp-Kasten (H.R. 5533; S. 2600)
Quayle (S. 1040)
Hatfield (S. 2158)
Crane (H.R. 542)
Mitchell (S. 1767)
Hansen (H.R. 170)
Heftel (H.R. 5841)
Stark (H.R. 6308)
Dreier (H.R. 1770)
Roth (S. 3042)
Treasury I proposal
50 Itemized deduction;
50% deduction for
nonitemizers
11.8 None
19.5 Itemized deduction
30 Deduction (at 14%)*
19 None
25 Deduction*
30 Deductiont
30 20% credit over 1%
AGI
10 None
36 Itemized deduction
(at 12%)
15 Deduction for
religious gifts*
50 Itemized deduction to
5% AGI
50 Deduction reduced
by 10%
14 None
45 Deduction*
35 Itemized deduction
over 2% AGI;
constructive
realization
Modifications of current law
20% charitable credit 50 20% tax credit
Full deduction for nonitemizers 50 Deductiont
No charitable deduction 50 None
Present law with 10% surtax 55 See 1985 law
Present law with VAT 50 See 1985 law
*Deduction for nonitemizers assumed 50% in 1985.
tAssumed to apply filly to nonitemizers.
"Intended explicitly to increase revenues. No revenue adjustment assumed.
- 32
- 17
- 27
- 15
- 23
- 30
- 15
- 22
- 13
- 26
- 22
- 21
- 13
- 27
-8
- 19
- 13
+ 3
- 26
- 15
- 8**
- 32
- 7
- 20
-11
+ 6
- 32
+ 4**
- 2**
Finally, the table presents the change in giving effected by several
modifications of 1985 law, including a 20% credit in place of the charitable
deduction, a full deduction for nonitemizers (in place of the 50% deduction),
the elimination of the deduction, a general surtax, and a supplementary value-
added tax.
The estimates in Table 8 clearly suggest that tax reform proposals will
have the effect of reducing charitable giving by individuals. Although the
magnitudes differ-with the largest declines in proposals that drop the
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deduction altogether-all of the tax reform proposals imply declines. The
smallest declines occur in proposals that retain the current deduction and
maintain relatively high marginal tax rates. The only proposal associated with
an increase in giving is the current law with a surtax tacked on; such a law
would have higher rather than lower tax rates and consequently lower prices
of charitable giving.
VI
CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, it is obviously too early to know the final shape
of taxes in the "Reagan era." However, the legislation of the first term and
the proposals of 1983 and after highlight two important effects. The first and
more important is tax rate reduction. Reductions in marginal tax rates,
embodied in ERTA and a host of proposed tax changes, have the effect of
increasing the net cost of giving a dollar to charity. As long as the deduction
remains the chief tax incentive Congress can give, its cuts of the tax rate will
tend to weaken that tax incentive. Increases in after-tax income may, at some
income levels, exert a positive effect on giving, but in general the adverse
price effects will tend to dominate these income effects. These adverse price
effects are most evident in the income tax, but they are also present in the rate
cuts in the estate tax.
A second effect of Reagan era tax legislation is its impact on the incentive
of nonitemizing taxpayers to make contributions. From the time of the
introduction of the standard deduction in 1944 until 1981, the income tax had
offered nonitemizers no reduction in the price of giving. Consequently, the
phased-in deduction for nonitemizers in ERTA represents a change in tax
policy of great importance. It is by no means clear, however, whether this
provision will be retained in the tax law. Besides the existence of the itemized
charitable deduction itself, no other tax provision except the rate structure
has so much potential impact on the level of charitable giving as the deduction
for nonitemizers. Only if a tax credit is adopted in place of the charitable
deduction for both itemizers and nonitemizers will the deductibility of gifts
and rate of taxation lose their central importance in determining the level of
philanthropic giving in this country. As long as the deduction is the basic
form of incentive for giving, the trends toward tax rate reduction and
limitation of the deduction will tend to discourage charitable giving.
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